## Improving the delivery of transfer payments

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#### **Overview**


Three parts to this session:

- the nature of transfer payments
- some implications from behavioural economics for the design of transfer payments
- some ideas for the future

#### Part 1

The nature of transfer payments


#### Transfer programmes – in and out of work



#### Reach and size

- \$22 billion in government expenditure a year
- One in 8 working age New Zealanders on a benefit in 2010, three-quarters of families receive WFF
- 300,000 beneficiaries
- 400,000 families getting WFF
- 305,000 getting AS
- 138,600 child support custodial parents


#### Cash transfers as a percentage of Core Crown Expenditure, 2014/15



#### **Transitions**

- There are large flows of people transitioning into or out of the transfer payment system each year
- In 2012 the equivalent of 8% of the population aged 18-64 started or cancelled a main benefit

#### Number of transitions from main benefit in 2012, by activity in subsequent month (LEED)



#### **Overlap**

Figure 1: WfFTC, Accommodation Supplement and ChildCare Assistance






Figure 5: WFF Group (WfFTC, AS and CCA) and Child Support Status



NCP 138,000 CPR 140,000 WFF 717,000

#### The structure of payments

Income after tax and transfers for a sole parent with 2 children living in Auckland, 2010



### What do individuals receiving payments say?

"You're all the government why can't you talk to each other and get the information?"

#### Part 2

# Some implications of behavioural economics for the design of transfer payments

#### **Objectives and trade-offs**

The rationale for transfer payments involve protecting against risks (eg unemployment), the transfer of resources across the life cycle (eg child payments), and pure redistribution.

Design of income transfers requires explicit consideration of multiple objectives.

Optimal design requires consideration of trade-offs between different objectives.

# The traditional 'iron triangle' framework for income transfer policy Fiscal costs

Poverty alleviation


Distortionary

employment (and other)

incentives

#### Payment design


#### Income of sole parent with 2 children living in Auckland earning \$14.25 per hour



#### The detailed design of payments is important

- Automatic enrolment in pensions
- H&R Block experiment

#### **Impacts of H&R Block Experiment**



Source: Bettinger et al (2009) The role of simplification and information in college decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA Experiment, NBER Working Paper 15361

#### Making payments easier to use

Easier to use in work payment $\rightarrow$	Impact on payment	Potential impact on outcomes
Lower cost of applying for payment (eg automatic calculation of entitlement rather than application forms)	Higher take-up of payment	Increased employment, lower poverty rates, impact on fiscal costs depends on employment responsiveness
Lower cost of complying with rules associated with payment (eg correctly reporting income each week)	Less non-compliance and possibly higher take-up	Increased employment, lower poverty rates, should reduce fiscal costs

#### Designing an easy to use payment system

New technology holds out the promise of radically changing these user costs in payment systems.

Comprehensive administrative data on individuals and their circumstances means that many 'applications' and also 'compliance' activities can be automated:

- birth of a child
- changes in income
- hours of use of registered childcare
- rental payments
- changes in relationship status


At the heart of this is authoritative administrative data on individuals that might be managed jointly across agencies.

The key is system design that starts from the perspective of the individual rather than the bureaucracy – and understands the varied nature of journeys that individuals make across government systems.

#### **Developing better evidence**

- information directly from recipients about their experience and suggestions for improvements
- better use of administrative data to analyse incidence of payments in and out of work
- randomised control trials of key design improvements eg automated abatement, well designed communication

#### Percentage of job seekers turning up to the Jobcentre (Behavioural Insights RCT)




#### **Part 3:**


## Some ideas for the future (to make it easier)

#### The Growth and Development of Social Security in New Zealand (1950)

Published by the Social Security Department with the co-operation of the Health Department




Keeping the Records



Part of the National Index



Paying the People. The Old Method-Writing Payment Warrants by



The New Mechanized Method-Punching Powers-Samas Cards



Producing the Monthly Pay Warrants



Despatching the Warrants Each Month

#### **Example: better use of information**

Working for Families tax credits require information on:

- Family income details
- Number and age of dependent children
- Relationship status
- Shared care information
- Residency, age of carer
- Work hours per week
- Receipt of benefit payments, Paid Parental Leave, ACC
- Basic payment information eg bank account.

All information is requested from the family

but providing the information could reduce regular payments.

#### **Example: better use of information**

#### Working for Families tax credits

- What?
- Using more accurate income information to reduce the need for individuals to pro-actively inform IR of income earned
- Use external authoritative data:
  - MSD on receipt of benefits
  - DIA birth data for age of child
  - Customs/Immigration residency

Shared care:

Use of child support information?

- Why?
- Reduces the compliance hassle for individuals
- Reduces omission/fraud and debt
- Reduces underpayments
- Individuals can focus on more important information updating family status

#### **Example: information sharing**

Welfare benefits require information on:

- Family income details
- Age of dependent children (if any)
- Relationship status
- Residency, age of person
- Work hours per week
- Compliance with obligations

Similar information to Working for Families tax credits and Child Support.

#### **Example: information sharing**

#### Welfare benefits

What?

 Use income information from IR to reduce the need for individuals to pro-actively inform of income earned

Why?

- Reduces the compliance hassle for individuals
- Reduces omission/fraud and debt
- Reduces underpayments
- Individuals can focus on more important information updating family status and obligations

#### What will it take to make it work?

#### Common definitions?

- family income
- sole parent
- work
- shared care

Reciprocity – MSD providing family status updates to IR?

Flexibility - may want to use different bank accounts for different payments.

Public acceptance of more information sharing and more frequent contact.

#### **Looking ahead**

Period of assessment - should income/assessment be real time or delayed?

- Child support can be based on income from 2 years ago
- WFF tax credits are real time

Should the income period of assessment be annual, quarterly, monthly, weekly?

- Regular vs seasonal workers
- Casual workers

